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Fungibility of money is a central assumption in the theory of consumer choice: any
unit of money is substitutable for another. This implies that the composition of
income or wealth is irrelevant for consumption. We nd in a eld experiment that
even in a simple, incentivized setup many subjects do not treat money as fungible.
When a label is attached to a part of their budget, subjects change consumption
according to the label. A controlled laboratory experiment conrms this result and
further shows that subjects with lower cognitive abilities are more likely to violate
fungibility. The ndings lend support to behavioral models of narrow bracketing and
mental accounting. One implication of our results is that in-kind benets distort
consumption more strongly than usually assumed.
JEL classication: C91, C93, D01, H31, I38.
Keywords: Fungibility, In-kind Benets, Mental Accounting, Narrow Bracketing,
Field Experiment, Laboratory Experiment
yFinancial support from the DFG (through GRK 629), the Bonn Graduate School of Economics,
and the Nottingham School of Economics is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Sumit Agarwal,
Stefano DellaVigna, Gabrielle Fack, Simon G achter, Uri Gneezy, Lorenz Goette, Paul Heidhues,
Steen Huck, David Human, David Jaeger, Peter Kooreman, Anne Laferr ere, David Laibson,
Ulrike Malmendier, Wolfram Merzyn, J org Oechssler, Susanne Ohlendorf, Robert Oxoby, Hans-
Theo Normann, Matthew Rabin, Marieke Schnabel, Lael Schooler, Bob Sugden, Uwe Sunde, Ian
Walker, Georg Weizs acker, Matthias Wibral, Ro'i Zultan, and especially Steen Altmann and
Armin Falk for helpful discussions and Susanne Nett, Daniel Nett, and Petra Gabler for helping to
conduct the eld experiment. Valuable comments were also received from numerous seminar and
conference participants.
Corresponding author: johannes.abeler[at]nottingham.ac.uk; University of Nottingham, School
of Economics, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, UK1 Introduction
A central assumption in the theory of consumer choice is the fungibility of money|
any unit of money is substitutable for another. As a consequence, the composition of
wealth (or income, respectively) is irrelevant for choices and consumption decisions
are based on total wealth alone.
In contrast, several behavioral theories of decision-making argue that individ-
ual choices often violate fungibility. Theories of narrow bracketing (Tversky &
Kahneman 1981, Barberis et al. 2006, Rabin & Weizs acker 2009) are based on the
assumption that people break down complex decision problems into several parts and
decide on each part separately. Narrow bracketing predicts that consumers ignore
background wealth or other income sources when deciding on how to spend, e.g.,
their labor income. Similarly, models of mental accounting (Thaler 1980, 1985, 1999)
assume that consumers form mental budgets to organize their nancial decisions.
As money is not fungible across these mental budgets, choices can be constrained.
Consumers might violate fungibility also because of feelings of reciprocity towards
the provider of the income. The person or institution who provided the money
might have clearly stated preferences about the nal allocation of consumption. For
example, many governments state explicitly that they care about the welfare of chil-
dren when handing out child benets. To reciprocate the kind act of the benefactor,
the consumer might want to honor these stated preferences, change consumption
accordingly, and thereby violate fungibility (for related models of reciprocity, see
Rabin 1993, Falk & Fischbacher 2006).
An ideal way to investigate whether consumers treat money as fungible is to
analyze their spending behavior when they receive targeted payments. In particular,
consider the case in which a consumer receives a non-distortionary in-kind grant,
i.e., an in-kind grant with an amount lower than what the consumer would have
spent on the targeted good anyway. For example, one could think of a tenant
who wants to spend $500 on rent and receives housing benets of $200. Rational
consumers, who treat money as fungible, will spend such an in-kind grant in exactly
the same way as an unconditional cash grant: By shifting their remaining budget,
they can comply with the condition of the grant and still reach the same rst-best
consumption level. The only dierence to a cash grant is the label attached to the
grant. By contrast, a consumer who does not treat the targeted payment as fungible
will not use the possibility to reallocate parts of his original budget and will increase
his consumption of the targeted good beyond the level of the rst-best consumption
1bundle.1
Field evidence on how consumers spend in-kind benets might therefore help to
answer whether consumers treat money as fungible. Unfortunately, this eld data is
inuenced by many factors that make it hard to clearly identify whether consumer
behavior is caused by violations of fungibility or not. For example, increases in
housing benets for low-income tenants have lead to pronounced rent increases (e.g.,
Susin 2002, Gibbons & Manning 2006, Fack 2006). This eect could well be driven
by a violation of fungibility, as tenants' willingness to pay for a given apartment
is increased and landlords take advantage of this. However, these price increases
might also be due to the low elasticity of housing supply. More direct evidence
on fungibility comes from labeled cash grants like child benets. Kooreman (2000)
nds that the marginal propensity to consume child clothing out of child benets
is higher than out of other income, violating fungibility. But even for this kind of
benet it is debated how other factors such as intra-household bargaining or the
characteristics of the benet payment (e.g., periodicity) inuence results (see Blow
et al. 2007, Edmonds 2002).
In this paper, we use controlled experiments as an alternative and complementary
way to investigate whether consumers treat money as fungible. Our experimental
setup allows for clear identication of causality, since the type of benet received is
exogenously imposed by the experimenter. Moreover, we can investigate behavior
in a tightly controlled environment where the factors confounding eld data are
excluded by design.
We pursue a dual research strategy by combining a eld experiment and a lab-
oratory experiment, both based on the same general design. Subjects decide over
the consumption of two goods. In addition to their cash endowment, subjects either
receive a non-distortionary in-kind grant or a cash grant of equal size. Both grants
are paid lump-sum. Rational subjects who treat money as fungible should not be
inuenced by whether the grant is given as cash or in kind. In contrast, subjects
who do not treat money as fungible will spend this grant disproportionately on the
targeted good and thus consume too much of this good.
We chose a restaurant as setting for our eld experiment because in this environ-
ment guests consume two distinct goods: they eat and they drink at least a minimal
amount. Thus, an in-kind grant below this minimal amount does not distort the
consumption decision. Guests received either a voucher for beverage consumption
1A similar phenomenon has been called a \ypaper eect" as the money \sticks where it hits"
(e.g., Hines & Thaler 1995).
2or a voucher for the total bill. They did not know that they participated in an ex-
periment. Participants thus acted in a naturally occurring, incentivized, well-known
environment and felt unobserved. They could not self-select into treatments or the
experiment at all since vouchers came as a surprise to participants after they had
entered the restaurant and since treatments were assigned exogenously. We nd that
an 8-euro beverage voucher increases beverage consumption on average by 3.90 euros
compared to a bill voucher. The dierence between treatments is thus very large,
almost half of the treatment manipulation. We show that this eect is not driven by
the few guests for whom the voucher could have been distortionary. This indicates
that guests are inuenced by the label attached to the voucher and thus spend too
much on the targeted good, violating fungibility.
The laboratory experiment oers an even more controlled and well-dened setup.
Again, subjects could consume two goods and had at their disposal a cash budget
and either an in-kind grant or a cash grant. We induced a payo function by
specifying monetary payos for all possible consumption levels. We thus know the
optimal decision and can guarantee that the in-kind grant was non-distortionary for
every subject. We nd that, as in the eld experiment, subjects spend signicantly
more on the targeted good when the grant is given in kind. They also choose
consumption bundles further away from the optimal decision and thus overall earn
less money than subjects who receive the cash grant. A major advantage of the
laboratory experiment is that we can collect further information about subjects to
investigate the mechanisms underlying the treatment eect. Since using heuristics
like narrow bracketing or mental accounting greatly reduces the complexity of the
consumption decision, subjects who have lower cognitive ability should be more
prone to this kind of cognitive bias. This hypothesis is conrmed by the data: the
treatment dierence is driven by subjects with lower cognitive skills. Moreover,
subjects' tendency to violate fungibility is not inuenced by their inclination to
honor the stated preferences of a potential benefactor. This result thus points to
narrow bracketing or mental accounting as the underlying reason for the violation
of fungibility in the lab experiment.2
Our paper provides several novel insights: First, while there is a growing number
of papers showing that investment decisions are often not in line with fungibility, we
reveal a violation of fungibility for consumption decisions. For example, Choi et al.
(2009) show that investors do not consider their existing portfolio when deciding how
2Frederick (2005), Benjamin et al. (2006), and Casari et al. (2007) also nd that people with
lower cognitive skills tend to act in accordance with theories of boundedly rational behavior whereas
people with higher cognitive skills are more likely to behave in line with standard economic theory.
3to invest their 401(k) contribution (see also Odean 1998). Second, and related to the
rst point, we demonstrate that many subjects violate fungibility in a setting where
risk aversion or loss aversion cannot play a role, since they face a riskless choice in
which no losses are possible. Most earlier work focused on risky settings and relied on
risk or loss aversion for their predictions (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman 1981, Gneezy
& Potters 1997, Thaler et al. 1997, Rabin & Weizs acker 2009). Third, previous lab-
oratory experimental studies on narrow bracketing of consumption decisions were
not incentivized (e.g., Heath & Soll 1996, O'Curry 1997). Since subjects might
use simplifying heuristics more readily if they do not face a payo penalty for sub-
optimal decisions, these studies might have overestimated the prevalence of such
heuristics. By using an incentivized laboratory experiment, we exclude this pos-
sibility. Fourth, the only existing studies investigating consumption decisions in
incentivized environments analyze how people spend a gift or a windfall gain (e.g.,
Bodkin 1959, Arkes et al. 1994, Milkman & Beshears 2009). Most windfall gains are
negligibly small compared to life-time wealth and should not alter spending behavior
if customers treat wealth and windfall gain as fungible; but these studies nd that
people spend more after receiving a gift or windfall gain. If, however, the receipt
of a gift or windfall gain per-se changes consumption patterns (e.g., because of a
change in the recipient's mood3 or for other reasons), it is not evident whether a
change in spending can be clearly linked to a violation of fungibility. This cannot
impact the main treatment comparisons in our study as subjects in both treatments
receive a voucher of identical amount and only the type of voucher diers. Finally,
by replicating the setup of the eld experiment under laboratory conditions, we
demonstrate the usefulness of laboratory experiments in complementing eld evi-
dence. In the laboratory, we can elicit extensive information about the subjects and
about their decision processes. This allows us to explore the underlying mechanisms
driving behavior and makes it possible to understand and interpret the results from
the eld (see also Falk & Heckman 2009, Charness & Villeval 2009).
It is important to investigate whether individual decisions are in line with fun-
gibility to better understand consumer behavior in general. But the specic design
of our study also suggests implications for public policy. We show that many con-
sumers indeed do not treat money as fungible. Therefore, in-kind benets will
distort consumers' decisions more strongly than previously thought. Our results
suggest, for instance, that part of the rent increase induced by housing benets is
due to a violation of fungibility. In our view, this problem can be mitigated by
3For some examples of the extensive research in psychology and marketing on the inuence of
mood on (consumption) choices, see Kahn & Isen (1993), Lewinsohn & Mano (1993), Groenland
& Schoormans (1994), Winkielman et al. (2005), or Qiu & Yeung (2007).
4linking housing benets less saliently to rent payments to make it easier for tenants
to treat this targeted grant as fungible. The periodicity of the benet payments, for
instance, could be chosen to dier from the periodicity of the rent payments. There
are, however, other applications for which it might be desirable if recipients violate
fungibility. If the government strongly believes that the consumption decisions of
some households are not optimal (e.g., too little spending on child-related goods),
it could use a violation of fungibility to improve these consumption decisions. By
simply stating the intended use of the grant or by giving an in-kind grant that is
non-distortionary, consumers who violate fungibility could be induced to buy more
of the targeted good. This would not restrict or inuence the consumption decisions
of rational households, in line with the idea of libertarian paternalism proposed by
Thaler & Sunstein (2003).
The paper is organized as follows: The general design of both experiments is
described in Section 2. Section 3 reports the detailed design and results of the
eld experiment. Section 4 presents results of the laboratory experiment. Section 5
concludes.
2 Experimental Design
Our two experiments are designed to create tightly controlled environments in which
we can directly test whether consumers treat money as fungible. We examine this
question in a simple two-goods consumption case by investigating how consumers
spend dierent kinds of lump-sum grants. Assume that a consumer has a cash
budget of amount C at his disposal and additionally receives a grant of amount G.
In the Cash treatment, the grant is given lump-sum in cash. In the Label treatment,
the grant has the same amount but it is an in-kind grant, i.e., it has to be spent
on one of the two goods, the targeted good. To illustrate, consider the indierence
curve diagram in Figure 1. The targeted good (t) is on the horizontal axis and the
other good (o) is on the vertical axis. For simplicity, the price of the targeted good is
normalized to pt = 1. The dot-and-dash line is the budget constraint if the consumer
has only the cash budget C at his disposal. Assume that the optimal consumption
bundle for this budget constraint is A0. The dashed line is the budget constraint
in the Cash treatment, given by the sum of C and G. The optimal consumption
bundle for this budget constraint is A. In the Label treatment, the grant is paid
in kind; the consumer faces a kinked budget constraint (solid line). The crucial
feature of our design is that the amount of the grant G is lower than the amount tA
spent optimally on the targeted good. Thus, the consumer can reallocate parts of
5his cash budget to still reach the rst-best choice A. The in-kind grant in the Label
treatment is therefore non-distortionary. Under the assumption that subjects treat
money as fungible, consumption should be identical across treatments; treatments
merely dier in the label attached to the grant.
Now consider a consumer who does not treat money as fungible. In the Cash
treatment, we would still expect such a consumer to choose the rst-best bundle A
as both income components are cash. The dierence to the standard model occurs
in the Label treatment. The consumer will allocate the cash endowment optimally
(bundle A0). The grant will, however, be spent disproportionally on the targeted
good as the consumer does not take advantage of the possibility to reallocate parts of
his cash budget. In the case of complete non-fungibility, this results in a consumption
of bundle B where tB = tA0 +G (see Figure 1). If both goods are normal, tB  tA.4
Therefore, if at least some subjects do not treat money as fungible, we should ex-
pect average consumption of the targeted good in the Label treatment to be higher
than in the Cash treatment. We cannot tell directly from this setup which under-
lying mechanism causes a potential violation of fungibility. In the lab experiment,
however, we are able to collect further information on the subjects and their decision
process that will shed light on the possible channels.
In the next section, we present the detailed design and results of the eld exper-
iment. The lab experiment is discussed in Section 4
3 Field experiment
3.1 Design of the Field Experiment
We chose a restaurant as setting to conduct the eld experiment as it is the ideal
environment to implement the setup we want to investigate: since guests typically
consume a minimal amount of two distinct goods (beverages and meals), giving
an in-kind grant that is smaller than this minimal amount will not distort the
consumption decision. The experiment took place in a wine restaurant situated
in the palatinate, a well-known wine-growing region of southern Germany. The
restaurant itself is located in a winery. Usual per-person spending in this restaurant
4If a violation of fungibility is driven by narrow bracketing or mental accounting, this reasoning
depends on the order in which cash budget and grant are spent. If the consumer spent the grant
rst, he would be able to allocate the cash budget so as to reach bundle A. In the experiments,












Figure 1: The targeted good (t) is on the horizontal axis, the other good (o) is on
the vertical axis. The dashed line is the budget constraint when the grant is given in
cash. The solid line is the budget constraint when the grant is given in kind. The
dot-and-dash line is the budget constraint when no grant is given.
is about 40 euros (54 USD at the time of the experiment); about 40 percent of the
total is spent on beverages. This setting thus matches the two-goods case presented
in Figure 1 particularly well.
Guests were not aware of participating in an experiment. Upon arrival at the
restaurant, they learned that the restaurant was celebrating its fourth anniversary
(which was indeed the case) and that they would receive an 8-euro voucher per per-
son (11 USD). The type of voucher diered by day: on days of the Cash treatment,
vouchers were given as \gourmet voucher" that could be spent on both beverages and
meals. This treatment serves as our primary control treatment. On days of the Label
treatment, vouchers were given as a \gourmet beverage voucher". These vouchers
were restricted to be spent on beverages. We knew from communication with the
owner of the restaurant that, without getting a voucher, the overwhelming majority
of guests consumes beverages worth more than 8 euros (it is very unusual to not con-
sume beverages in German restaurants; water must also be purchased). Therefore,
the beverage voucher should be non-distortionary.5 Both types of vouchers had to
5The design of the experiment made it impossible to rule out that some participants could have
wanted to consume less than the amount of the grant, as total consumption had a high variance.
In Section 3.2 we will present results that show that our treatment eects are not driven by these
participants. In the laboratory experiment, described in the next section, we can ensure that
7be redeemed the same evening. In a third treatment, the Baseline treatment, guests
did not receive any voucher.
We have data on 552 guests. Overall, 107 vouchers were distributed in the Label
treatment and 89 vouchers in the Cash treatment, one per person.6 356 persons
participated in the Baseline treatment. We consider each table in the restaurant
as one independent observation and calculate all values per person. Since we dis-
tributed one voucher per person, we can relate per-person consumption directly to
the amount of a single voucher. This leaves us with 37 independent observations in
the Label treatment, 34 in the Cash treatment, and 116 in the Baseline treatment.
During the observed period, the menu did not change and the same two waiters were
present in the restaurant. Our data consist of the detailed bill per table showing all
consumed items; we also know how many persons correspond to each bill.
3.2 Results of the Field Experiment
First, we demonstrate that consumption of the targeted good (beverages) is higher
in the Label treatment than in the Cash treatment.
Result 1: Spending on the targeted good (beverages) is signicantly higher
in the Label treatment than in the Cash treatment.
We document consumption averages for the three treatments in Table 1. Partic-
ipants in the Label treatment|who receive a beverage voucher|spend on aver-
age 18.94 euros per person on alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, 3.90 euros
more than participants in the Cash treatment and also more than participants who
didn't receive either voucher. This treatment dierence is very large compared the
value of the grant (8 euros) and to average beverage consumption across treatments
(16.21 euros) and in line with the hypothesis that consumers violate fungibility.
Participants in the Cash treatment spend more on meals than subjects in both
other treatments. This translates into higher total consumption in both voucher
treatments compared to the Baseline treatment.
To test whether these dierences are statistically signicant, we use OLS regres-
the grant is non-distortionary for all subjects by choosing an appropriate payo function and by
endowing every subject with the same budget.
6The restaurant rst issued all beverage vouchers. From the next day on, the remaining vouchers
were issued as bill vouchers. This was done for practical reasons, as the restaurant feared that
switching treatments on a daily basis would be too confusing for the waiters (see, e.g., Bandiera
et al. (2005) for a eld experiment with similar treatment sequencing).
8Table 1: Average Consumption Across Treatments
Baseline treatment Cash treatment Label treatment
Beverage consumption 15.69 15.03 18.94
Meal consumption 24.18 27.68 25.86
Total consumption 39.87 42.71 44.80
Notes: All amounts denoted in euro.
sions and regress per-person consumption on a dummy for receiving a voucher at all
and a dummy for being in the Label treatment. Our main focus will be on the coe-
cient of the Label dummy, since the comparison between Label and Cash treatment
allows for the cleanest interpretation whether fungibility is violated. Participants in
both of these two treatments receive a voucher and changes in consumption patterns
because of receiving a voucher per-se cannot inuence the treatment comparison.
Table 2 reports results of regressions with per-person beverage consumption as
dependent variable. We nd that receiving a voucher per-se has no signicant im-
pact on beverage consumption. But receiving a beverage voucher instead of a bill
voucher signicantly increases spending on beverages (column 1). This means that
by merely attaching a label to the grant consumption of the targeted good is sig-
nicantly increased compared to an unlabeled voucher. Since beverage and meal
consumption are usually regarded as complements and since they are indeed highly
correlated in our sample (r = 0:442), we control for meal consumption in column 2
to isolate the direct eect of the type of voucher on beverage consumption. Also,
one might interpret meal consumption as a proxy for an important determinant of
(beverage) consumption: total wealth. Richer people arguably spend more on bev-
erages and also more on meals. By controlling for total wealth the precision of our
treatment eect estimation should thus improve. Indeed, we nd that the p-value
of the treatment eect is now lower (column 2). The point estimate of the treat-
ment eect (Label vs. Cash) increases a little bit since meal consumption is higher
in the Cash treatment than in the Label treatment. This is also the reason why
the voucher dummy has as weakly signicant negative coecient when we control
for meal consumption. The treatment eect stays signicant if we additionally in-
clude outside temperature and dummies for the day of the week as control variables
(column 3).
While subjects in the Label treatment use the voucher to increase their beverage
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10Table 3: Treatment Eect on Meal Consumption
Dependent variable: Meal consumption (in euro per person)
Full sample
(1) (2) (3)
1 if Either voucher 1.679** 0.176 0.209
(0.698) (0.679) (0.961)
1 if Cash treatment 1.814*** 3.619*** 3.349***
(0.597) (0.529) (0.741)
Beverage consumption 0.462*** 0.462***
(0.058) (0.057)
Outside temperature (in C) 0.016
(0.107)
Controls for day of the week No No Yes
Constant 24.184*** 16.929*** 15.894***
(0.599) (1.168) (1.889)
N.Obs. 187 187 187
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors clustered on day are in parentheses. Signicance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
increase their meal consumption. Table 3 reports estimates showing that partici-
pants in the Cash Treatment spend signicantly more on meals than participants
in the Label treatment (column 1). This eect is robust to controlling for beverage
consumption, outside temperature, and day of the week (columns 2 and 3). Re-
ceiving either voucher also increases meal consumption compared to participants
in the Baseline treatment, but the direct eect of receiving either voucher on meal
consumption goes away once we control for the indirect eect via beverage consump-
tion.
Because of the high variance in total per-person consumption, we could not ex-
clude the possibility that some guests would initially have liked to spend less on
beverages than the amount of the voucher. For these guests, the voucher was dis-
tortionary and they might have increased their beverage consumption to use the
voucher in full and not because of a violation of fungibility. Indeed, in 16 percent
of observations in the Cash and Baseline treatments, absolute beverage consump-
tion is lower than the value of the voucher. To take account of these potentially
11distorted decisions, we sort all observations by per-person beverage consumption
and exclude the lowest 16 percent in each treatment. As treatment assignment is
random, the distribution of initial willingness to consume beverages should be equal
across treatments and the grant should therefore be non-distortionary for all partic-
ipants in the restricted sample. In columns 4{6 of Table 2 we repeat the estimations
of columns 1{3 for the restricted sample. Results do not change. The treatment
eect between Label and Cash treatment is of very similar size and still signicant
even though the number of observation is smaller. Only the intercept is larger,
which is not surprising as we exclude the low-consumption observations for these
regressions. We can thus rule out that the treatment eect is driven by the minority
of participants for whom the voucher could have been distortionary.
Since the restaurant rst distributed all beverage vouchers and then all bill vouch-
ers, it might be that the treatment dierence in beverage consumption is driven by
an overall (falling) time trend in beverage consumption. As a further robustness
check, we test for such a trend with the data we collected before and after the two
main treatments when guests did not receive either voucher. If a time trend existed
in the two main treatments, it should also show up in this data. This is, however,
not the case. Participants after the two main treatments spend even a little bit more
on beverages than before but this dierence is not signicant.7
Next, we analyze the additional spending on beverages in the Label treatment
in more detail.
Result 2: Participants in the Label treatment do not consume more bever-
ages in terms of volume but they consume more expensive beverages.
To see whether participants in the Label treatment consume a larger volume of bev-
erages, we regress the volume of consumed beverages on the same set of explanatory
variables as in Table 2 (see Table A.1, columns 1{3, in the appendix). The eect of
the voucher and of the type of voucher on consumed volume is very small (e.g., Cash
vs Label: 0.050 ltr, or 2  oz, in column 1) and never signicant at the 5 percent
level. As in Table 2, we also report results for the sample restricted to participants
for whom the grant is non-distortionary (columns 4{6). We again nd that the
volume of consumed beverages does not dier between treatments.
In contrast, the type of voucher strongly inuences the average price of the
7Guests spend on average 15.38 euros on beverages before the two main treatments and 16.27 eu-
ros after. When we repeat the estimations of Table 2, columns 1-3, with an additional dummy for
observations before the two main treatments the p-values of the dummy are p = 0:494, p = 0:889
and p = 0:302.
12consumed beverages. Receiving any voucher at all does not have a signicant impact.
But if the voucher is targeted to beverages, the average price rises sharply and
signicantly. Participants in the Label treatment spend on average 21.91 euros per
liter, 3.52 euros more than participants in the Cash treatment (see Table A.2 in the
appendix). We therefore conclude that spending on beverages is higher in the Label
treatment because participants use the voucher to buy more expensive beverages.
So far we have argued that|if guests treated money as fungible|receiving a
beverage voucher compared to a bill voucher should not alter consumption behavior.
The same argument can also be applied to the comparison of guests who receive
either voucher and guests without voucher. The 8-euro increase in lifetime income
(by receiving the voucher) can surely be neglected. According to standard consumer
theory, we should thus expect consumption not to be inuenced by receiving a
voucher compared to not receiving a voucher. If fungibility is violated, receiving
any voucher could, however, inuence consumption. Keep in mind, though, that
the treatment comparison between voucher treatments and the Baseline treatment
might also be inuenced by several eects unrelated to fungibility. For example,
it might be that receiving a voucher as gift makes the recipient spend more just
because they get into a dierent mood by receiving a gift (see, e.g., Lewinsohn &
Mano 1993, Winkielman et al. 2005). Mood changes might also lead to less spending,
or spending could be reduced for other reasons, for example because receiving a
voucher makes it more salient that the meal has to be paid for at the end. We thus
report this comparison only for completeness. The treatment comparison Label vs.
Cash allows for cleaner conclusions as to whether participants decide in line with
fungibility or not since participants receive a voucher in both treatments.
Result 3: Overall spending is higher in both voucher treatments compared
to the Baseline treatment.
As shown above, beverage consumption is signicantly higher in the Label treat-
ment and meal consumption is higher in the Cash treatment. While beverage or
meal consumption individually are not robustly dierent between the two voucher
treatments and the Baseline treatment (see Tables 2 and 3), total consumption does
dier. In Table 4, columns 1 and 2, we regress total consumption on a dummy for
receiving either voucher and the same controls as in Table 2. Participants in the
Baseline treatment spend on average 39.87 euros per head. Participants in the two
voucher treatments spend signicantly more, on average 43.80 euros. In columns 3
and 4, we repeat these regressions for the restricted sample of participants for whom
the beverage voucher should be non-distortionary. The point estimates remain high
13Table 4: Treatment Eect on Total Consumption
Dependent variable: Total consumption (in euro per person)
Full sample Restricted sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 if Either voucher 3.930** 4.918** 3.900** 3.792
(1.629) (2.167) (1.572) (2.367)
Outside temperature (in C) -0.348 -0.117
(0.294) (0.347)
Controls for day of the week No Yes No Yes
Constant 39.871*** 44.883*** 43.100*** 46.489***
(1.012) (5.022) (1.277) (6.599)
N.Obs. 187 187 157 157
Notes: OLS estimates. Columns 1 and 2 report results for the full sample; columns 3 and 4 report
results for a sample from which potentially distorted participants are excluded (see text for details).
Robust standard errors clustered on day are in parentheses. Signicance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
but the eect is only signicant in the regression of column 3.8
4 Laboratory experiment
Combining a eld and a laboratory experiment has many advantages. While we can
analyze a more natural setting in the eld experiment where participants don't know
that they take part in an experiment, the laboratory oers three complementary
features. First, the lab allows for a more tightly controlled environment. We can
keep the budget equal for all subjects which is not possible in the eld. And since
we know the optimal decision in the lab (see below for details) we can guarantee
that the grant is non-distortionary for all subjects and thus do not have to exclude
potentially distorted subjects. Second, we can gather a more informative measure of
behavior than in the eld: subjects decide on consumption for two budget constraints
8Total consumption is not signicantly dierent between Label and Cash treatment. If we
include an additional dummy for the Label treatment in the regressions of Table 4, p-values of the
Label dummy range from 0:298 to 0:815.
14which allows calculating a within-person measure of behavior. Finally, and most
importantly, we have more information about the subjects in the lab. We can
therefore investigate determinants of subjects' behavior by linking their consumption
decisions to individual subject characteristics and to additional features of their
behavior, like the time needed to reach a decision.
4.1 Design of the Laboratory Experiment
In the laboratory experiment, subjects had to make two subsequent consumption
decisions. In each stage, subjects were endowed with a cash budget that they could
spend on two goods. For each good, we dened a payo function by specifying
monetary payos for all possible consumption levels. A subject's total payo was the
sum of the payos for each of the two goods in both stages. In the rst decision stage,
which we will call baseline stage, subjects received a cash budget of 50 money units
which they could allocate freely on the two goods. The baseline stage was identical in
both treatments. The second stage, called grant stage, is our main treatment stage.
In the grant stage, subjects again had an endowment of 50 money units at their
disposal and additionally received a grant of 30 money units. The only dierence
between the two treatments was the type of the grant. In the Cash treatment,
the grant was given as an unconditional cash grant. In the Label treatment, the
grant was given as an in-kind grant, i.e., the money had to be spent entirely on
the targeted good. Parameters were chosen such that the in-kind grant was by
design non-distortionary for all subjects. By shifting the remainder of their budget
appropriately, subjects could reach the same optimal consumption bundle in both
treatments. For a rational subject, the only treatment dierence was therefore the
label attached to the grant.
The exact specication of the payo functions is presented in Table 5. For each
good, payo increases in consumption and marginal payo weakly decreases. Prices
per unit were pt = 3 for the targeted good and po = 2 for the other good. Payo
functions and prices were the same in both stages. Unspent budget could neither be
saved nor did it yield any payo. There was no time limit for decisions. For these
parameters, the grant is worth 10 units of the targeted good and the consumption
bundles (t;o) displayed in Figure 1 are as follows: the optimal consumption bundle
in the baseline stage is A0 = (12;7); the optimal bundle in the grant stage is A =
(13;20); the bundle B is (22;7).9
9Obviously, when we say \optimal" decision we mean the \nancially optimal" decision. It
might well be that for subjects with lower cognitive skills it is overall not optimal to invest the
15Consumed units 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Payo
Targeted good 0 36 70 102 132 160 186 210 232 252 270 286 299
Other good 0 30 57 81 102 120 135 147 157 166 175 184 192
Consumed units 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Payo
Targeted good 310 316 322 328 333 338 343 347 351 355 358 361 364
Other good 200 208 216 223 230 237 244 251 256 261 266 271 276
Table 5: Payo functions in the laboratory experiment. \Targeted good" denotes
the good that the grant had to be spent on in the second stage of the Label treatment.
In order to make the dierence between the initial endowment and the grant
more salient, subjects had to earn their endowment in a real-eort task. Before
consumption decisions were taken, subjects had to count the number of zeros in
large spreadsheets that consisted of zeros and ones. When they managed to count
the correct number of zeros in a given amount of time they earned 100 money units
that were later split in half for the two consumption decisions.10 We chose this
rather boring activity to minimize the intrinsic motivation subjects could have for
the task and thus to strengthen their perception of really having earned the money
(cf. Cherry et al. 2002).
Subjects were students from the University of Bonn studying various majors
except Economics. Treatments were assigned randomly and no subject participated
in more than one treatment. At the beginning of the experiment, instructions were
read aloud and subjects had to answer a set of control questions to ensure that they
understood the task (see Appendix B for an English translation of the instructions).
Detailed instructions for the second stage were given only later on the computer
screen. This allowed us to have subjects of both treatments in the same session and
thus to align the delivery of the two treatments as much as possible. At the end of the
experiment, subjects answered a questionnaire. The experiment was computerized
additional eort to reach a higher monetary payo, see Section 4.2.2 for details.
10For a similar real-eort task, see Abeler et al. (forthcoming). The precise rules were as follows:
subjects got 8 large tables with 300 entries each. To complete the task, they had to count the
correct number of zeros on four sheets within 15 minutes. An answer was also counted as correct
if the number reported diered only by 1 from the true number. If subjects did not complete the
task, they got an endowment of 10 money units only. This was the case for 7 subjects who will be
excluded from the analysis.
16using z-Tree and ORSEE (Fischbacher 2007, Greiner 2004). 150 subjects completed
the real-eort task, 75 in each treatment. Payo points (cf. Table 5) were paid out
after the experimenter at a rate of 100 points = 1 euro. In addition to their earnings
from the consumption decisions, subjects received a show-up fee of 2.50 euros. On
average, subjects earned 12.20 euros (14.80 USD at the time of the experiment).
Sessions lasted between 60 and 70 minutes.
4.2 Results of the Laboratory Experiment
First, we show that, as in the eld experiment, giving a labeled grant instead of a
cash grant increases consumption of the targeted good. Then we explore possible
determinants for the observed violations of fungibility.
4.2.1 Consumption in the Experiment
Before we turn to the main stage of the experiment, the grant stage, we analyze
consumption decisions in the baseline stage. The design of the baseline stage was
the same in both treatments. Accordingly, we nd that behavior in this stage is not
dierent across treatments. In Table 6, column 1, we regress consumption of the
(later to be) targeted good in the baseline stage on a dummy for the Label treat-
ment.11 We use tobit estimates to account for the fact that subjects could only buy
up to 25 units of the targeted good.12 In column 2, we also control for gender, age,
and major of subjects. In both specications, the treatment eect is very small and
not signicant. This means that our random assignment to treatments worked. The
regressions further show that average consumption (11.4 units) is close to the opti-
mum of 12 units. Subjects apparently have no problem understanding the decision
problem and take the decision seriously. This is conrmed when we take the absolute
distance to the optimal consumption level as dependent variable; this measure also
treats too low consumption as error. Again, treatments are almost indistinguishable
(see Table 7, columns 1 and 2) and most subjects choose consumption levels close
to the optimum (average distance is 1.5 units). We are therefore condent that the
11For ease of exposition, we report only the consumption of the targeted good. Consumption
of the other good can then be readily calculated as very few subjects in the experiment choose a
consumption bundle that is not on the budget frontier (13 out of 300 decisions). Our results do
not change if we exclude subjects who choose bundles that are not on the budget frontier.
125 out of 150 subjects buy the maximum of 25 units in the grant stage. All results in this
section also hold if we employ OLS regressions instead of tobit.
17experimental setup allows for meaningful interpretation and that the experimental
incentives work.
Next, we analyze outcomes in the grant stage.
Result 4: Consumption of the targeted good is signicantly higher in the
Label treatment.
In the grant stage, subjects in the Label treatment buy too much of the targeted
good. They buy 16:6 units on average, compared to 14:4 units in the Cash treatment
and an optimal consumption level of 13. The estimates in Table 6, columns 3 and 4,
show that the treatment eect is highly signicant and remains unaected when
we control for subjects' age, gender, and major. In column 4, we also control for
the consumption of the targeted good in the baseline stage as this might inuence
consumption in the grant stage due to inertia or anchoring. The treatment eect is
also signicant when we take the distance to the optimal consumption as dependent
variable (Table 7, column 3). In column 4 of Table 7, we additionally control for the
distance to the optimal consumption level in the baseline stage, taking this as a proxy
for how well subjects are able to deal with the general decision problem at hand.
Again, subjects in the Label treatment choose consumption bundles signicantly
further away from the optimal bundle. By consuming too much of the targeted
good, subjects in the Label treatment leave money on the table as their choices
translate into signicantly lower payos.13
These results conrm the main nding of our eld experiment: even in this
stylized and tightly controlled environment subjects do not treat money as fungible.
Our next result documents the considerable heterogeneity we observe in behavior
across individuals.
Result 5: The treatment dierence is to a large part caused by subjects who
increase their consumption by the full amount of the grant.
The two-stage design of our experiment enables us to compute an intra-person mea-
sure of behavior by comparing decisions in the grant stage to decisions in the baseline
stage. A histogram of the intra-person change in consumption is shown in Figure 2.
The grant was worth 10 units of the targeted good. In line with the results reported
above, one can see clearly that the consumption increase is higher in the Label than
in the Cash treatment (t-test, p < 0:001). What is more interesting is that decisions
13With payo in the grant stage as dependent variable, the p-values of the treatment dummy
are 0:014 and 0:016 in tobit regressions equivalent to the specications in Table 6, columns 3 and
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Increase in consumption of targeted good
Cash Label
Figure 2: Consumption increase of the targeted good from baseline stage to grant
stage. The grant is worth 10 units of the targeted good.
are highly heterogeneous in the Label treatment. The most frequent consumption
increase in the Cash treatment is by either 1 or 2 units, often leading to a choice of
the optimal consumption bundle in the grant stage. In contrast, the modal choice
in the Label treatment is a consumption increase by 10 units, i.e., subjects spending
the entire grant on the targeted good on top of the consumption from the baseline
stage. Subjects who treat income sources as completely non-fungible will do exactly
this (cf. bundle B in Figure 1). In the Label treatment, 21 percent of subjects
spend the whole grant on the targeted good, while this is true for only 1 percent of
subjects in the Cash treatment.14 These subjects drive a large part of the treatment
eect, but not all of it. If we exclude these subjects from the analysis, the treatment
dierence in absolute consumption remains, although it is considerably smaller and
less signicant (see Table 6, columns 5 and 6). The same is true if we take distance
to optimal consumption as dependent variable (Table 7, columns 5 and 6).
We thus nd that not all subjects are equally likely to violate fungibility. In the
the next section, we explore what determines this heterogeneity in behavior.
14As a consequence of their consumption decision, subjects who spend the entire grant on the
targeted good earn less than all other subjects and also less than the other subjects in the Label
treatment. If we regress payo in the grant stage on a dummy for subjects who increase consump-
tion by exactly 10 and control for treatment, the dummy's p-value is p = 0:005. If we restrict the
sample to the Label treatment the p-value is p = 0:011.
214.2.2 Determinants of Behavior
Several behavioral theories predict a violation of fungibility, most prominently the-
ories of cognitive biases like narrow bracketing or mental accounting. However,
consumers' spending of non-distortionary in-kind grants might also violate fungi-
bility because of a perceived obligation to reciprocate the receipt of the grant by
complying with the stated preferences of the giver. We cannot say how important
this mechanism is for recipients of state benets or for the participants in our eld
experiment but it should be diminished in our highly stylized lab experiment. Con-
sumption decisions were about abstract goods and the payos for each good were
converted into real money directly after the experiment. In addition, the instruc-
tions did not state any kind of preference over how the money should be allocated
across the two goods.15 The fact that many subjects increase their consumption
by exactly the amount of the grant also speaks against a stated-preference eect:
Even if an otherwise rational subject wants to honor the stated preferences of the
grant giver, consumption could be increased by more or less than the amount of
the grant. Spending exactly this amount is only predicted by narrow bracketing or
mental accounting.16
But can we nd more direct evidence that narrow bracketing or similar cog-
nitive biases drive the treatment eect in the lab? A consumer who brackets his
decisions narrowly will violate fungibility but also greatly reduce the complexity of
the consumption decision. Subjects who have diculties with abstract reasoning
and complex decisions will have a larger gain from reducing the complexity of the
decision. We therefore expect these subjects to violate fungibility more often and,
as a consequence, to be more inuenced by the treatment manipulation. In their
survey of narrow bracketing, Read et al. (1999) also conjecture that: \Cognitive
limitations|in perception, attention, memory, and analytical processing, etc.|are
one important determinant of bracketing." However, there is so far no evidence for
this conjecture. If narrow bracketing drives behavior in our experiment, we should
nd that subjects' cognitive skills are negatively correlated with the treatment eect.
15Any suggestion (or informed-principal) eect should also be reduced in the lab experiment.
Such an eect assumes that subjects believe that the benevolent grant provider has more informa-
tion about the optimal consumption level than they do and that the label attached to the grant
is informative about optimal consumption. Thus, subjects rationally follow the suggestion of the
label. But in our lab experiment, subjects do have all necessary information available and could
easily check whether the suggestion of the label leads to higher payos, which was indeed not the
case.
16We will also test for the importance of perceived obligation directly, see below.
22Our next result supports this hypothesis.
Result 6: The treatment dierence in consumption is driven by subjects
with lower cognitive skills.
We use subjects' math grade in their nal high school exam as a proxy for their
cognitive, especially nonverbal, ability. This is a good proxy for several reasons.
Math is a compulsory course that every high school pupil has to take; the grade
is highly incentivized since it is used to determine university entrance and employ-
ment decisions; the grade covers performance over a long period (usually 2 years),
reducing measurement error; and, most importantly, it is highly correlated with
other measures of intelligence and cognitive ability.17 The grades were elicited in
the post-experimental questionnaire. Grades range from 1 (best grade) to 5 (fail),
a higher grade thus indicates a poorer performance.
In Table 8, columns 1{4, we regress consumption of the targeted good on a treat-
ment dummy, the math grade of subjects and an interaction of grade and treatment.
We include the same control variables as in Table 6. By including dummies for sub-
jects' major we control for any additional eect of university (math) education that
might inuence decision making. The specication in column 1 of Table 8 shows
that math grade has no eect in the baseline stage of either treatment. Thus, the
math grade does not just capture being better able to tackle the consumption de-
cision posed in the experiment. Also in the grant stage (column 2), there is no
eect on behavior in the Cash treatment (the coecient of grade is very small and
not signicant). Only the eect on behavior in the Label treatment is pronounced
and signicant. If the math grade gets worse by one grade, a subject increases
consumption by 1.01 units on average. In fact, the math grade captures the whole
treatment eect, the treatment dummy is not signicant anymore. The result that
the math grade has only an eect on behavior in the Label treatment but not in
the Cash treatment is corroborated when we estimate separate regressions for each
treatment (columns 3 and 4). This avoids identication of the impact of the math
grade by imposing identical coecients on the control variables. While the eect in
17For example, Deary et al. (2007) found in a large, representative sample that the correlation
between an individual's general intelligence factor g at age 11 and their math grade at age 16
was 0:77. g is what standard cognitive-ability tests (or \IQ"-tests) try to measure. This correlation
was higher than the correlation of g with the grade of any other course. An alternative measure
of cognitive ability used by other studies is the subject's SAT or ACT score (e.g., Benjamin
et al. 2006, Casari et al. 2007). The correlation between SAT-score and g has been estimated
as 0:70 (Brodnick & Ree 1995) or 0:82 (Frey & Detterman 2004), very similar to the correlation
between math grade and g.
23the Cash treatment is not signicant, it is again sizable and signicant in the Label
treatment. The math grade coecients are signicantly dierent between these two
specications (2(1) test, p = 0:008).18
All these results hold if we take absolute distance to the optimal consumption as
dependent variable (see Table 8, columns 5{8). In these regressions, we control for
the distance to optimal consumption in the baseline treatment. This should be a
good proxy for how well subjects can deal with the payo functions and how serious
they take the decision. In these specications we can therefore further isolate the
eect of cognitive skills on the treatment dierence. These regressions yield the
same results: math grade does not inuence behavior in the baseline stage or in the
grant stage of the Cash treatment. But the worse the math grade, the larger is the
distance to the optimal consumption in the Label treatment.19
We have shown before that subjects who increase consumption by 10 units, i.e.,
who spend the entire grant on the targeted good, account for a large part of the
treatment eect. This behavior is also correlated with subjects' math grade: The
worse the math grade, the more likely it is that a subject increases consumption by
exactly 10 units.20 Interestingly, subjects who spend the entire grant on the targeted
good also dier in another decision characteristic: they decide much faster than the
remaining subjects. They need on average 116 sec for their decision, whereas the
other subjects need 267 sec, more than twice as long (t-test, p < 0:001). This
dierence suggests that spending the grant fully on the targeted good is the result
of a simple decision heuristic rather than extensive deliberations.
Although feelings of perceived obligation to comply with the stated preference of
18 The 7 subjects (3 in the Cash and 4 in the Label treatment) who did not complete the real-
eort task and who were excluded from the experiment have a lower average math grade than the
remaining sample (3.00 vs. 2.34). Result 4 thus underestimates the main treatment eect as we
exclude subjects who on average are more prone to the treatment manipulation.
19In the German high school system, there are two types of math course: intensive and basic
course (Leistungskurs and Grundkurs). If we control for the type of subjects' high school course,
results of Table 8 do not change and the math grade stays signicant. The course dummy is
never signicantly dierent from zero. Apparently, the math course dummy does not add much
information beyond math grade and university major.
20In a probit regression within the Label treatment of a dummy for \increasing consumption by
exactly 10" on a constant and the math grade, the marginal eect of the grade is 0:100 (p = 0:010),
i.e., if the grade gets worse by one, the probability to increase consumption by exactly 10 units
increases by 10 percentage points. We restrict the sample to the Label treatment, as only 1 out
of 17 subjects who increase consumption by 10 is in the Cash treatment and to avoid interaction


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25the grant giver should be reduced in our laboratory experiment, we still measured
subjects' feelings of obligation to see whether it aected their behavior. In the post-
experimental questionnaire, we described in a short vignette that a couple spent less
money on their kids than what they received as child benets.21 Subjects then had to
state how \justied" or \appropriate" (on a scale of 1 to 6) they found this behavior.
Note that the ctitious couple faces a similar decision situation as subjects did in the
experiment. In both situations, a rational decision maker should not be inuenced
by the label attached to the grant. But in contrast to the lab decision, the provider
of child benets (i.e., the government) has clearly stated preferences about the nal
allocation of consumption. This measure of perceived obligation does, however, not
predict behavior in the experiment. If we run a regression similar to the one in
column 2 of Table 8 but replace math grade by our measure of obligation, neither
the direct eect nor the interaction is signicant (p = 0:267 and p = 0:767).
This does not preclude the possibility that in other environments the felt obli-
gation to comply with the stated preferences of the giver additionally inuences
behavior. In our lab experiment, however, cognitive biases seem to drive the treat-
ment eect that we uncover, supporting theories of narrow bracketing and mental
accounting.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we pursued a dual research strategy by combining a natural eld
experiment and an incentivized laboratory experiment to test whether consumers
treat money as fungible. Both experiments yield the same result: many subjects
do not act in line with fungibility. In the lab, where we have more background
information about subjects, this eect is driven by subjects with lower cognitive,
especially mathematical, skills. This points to cognitive biases like narrow bracketing
or mental accounting as mechanism underlying a violation of fungibility.
We argued that fungibility plays an important role in a setting where it has
until now not been considered: the eect of in-kind benets on consumption and
market prices. Empirical studies have shown that a rise in housing benets has
21The full text of the vignette was: \Mr and Mrs Miller have two children (5 and 8 years old).
They earn a total amount of 2000 euros per month, after taxes. Additionally, they receive 180 euros
child benet per child, i.e., a total of 360 euros per month. Usually, they spend about 300 euros
per month for their children (child clothing, toys, etc.). They spend the rest of the child benet
on other things (e.g., their own hobbies)".
26lead to pronounced rent increases (see, e.g., Susin 2002, Gibbons & Manning 2006,
Fack 2006). In addition, Laferr ere & Le Blanc (2004) show that controlling for
apartment and neighborhood characteristics, landlords discriminate between non-
assisted tenants and tenants who receive housing assistance, charging the latter
group higher rents. Our results suggest that this eect is partly due to a violation
of fungibility and could thus be mitigated by linking housing benets less saliently
to rent payments to make it easier for tenants to treat this income source as fungible.
In other situations, it might, however, be desirable if recipients violate fungibility.
In the spirit of libertarian paternalism (Thaler & Sunstein 2003), one could inuence
consumption decisions by simply stating the intended use of a grant or by replacing
cash grants with non-distortionary in-kind grants.
Our results do not imply that everybody in every situation will violate fungibil-
ity. In our laboratory experiment, treating money as non-fungible is linked to lower
cognitive skills, suggesting that this behavior is a mistake and not driven by pref-
erences. Once the rational solution becomes obvious to subjects, e.g., by learning
or by explanation, it could be that subjects change their decision and choose the
optimal solution. Further experiments would be needed to test this hypothesis. An-
other possible next step would be to use the laboratory as a testbed for institutions
that could help subjects to treat money as fungible (cf. Plott 1997, Roth 2002).
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The general instructions (shown below) were identical for both treatments. The
only dierences between treatments appeared in the on-screen instructions that were
shown before the main stage of the experiment. The on-screen instructions are doc-
umented after the general instructions.
Welcome to today's decision experiment.
To start, please read these instructions carefully. At the end of the instruc-
tions you will nd some example questions. The experiment starts as soon as all
participants have answered these questions correctly.
Please note that it is not allowed to communicate with other participants of the
experiment from now on. If this should happen, the experiment loses its scientic
value and we have to stop the experiment. If you have any questions, please hold
your hand out of the cubicle; we will then come to you.
The experiment consists of two parts. They will be called work phase and
shopping phase. During the work phase you have the possibility to earn talers.
You can then use these talers for shopping during the shopping phase. The value
your purchases have for you will be denoted in points during the experiment. Di-
rectly after the experiment, the points you achieved will be summed up and paid in
cash to you according to an exchange rate of
1 point = 0.01 euros
In addition, you receive 2.50 euros for having showed up on time. The 2.50 euros
will be paid after the experiment independently of your decisions and additionally
to the amount you earn during the experiment.
Work phase
During the work phase you have the opportunity to earn 100 talers. The work
consists of counting the number of zeros in tables lled with zeros and ones. Below,
you see an example table with 3 rows and 8 columns. The tables used in the
experiment are larger, they contain 10 rows and 30 columns.
Example of work phase
351 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
You earn the 100 talers if you succeed in nding the correct number of zeros in
four tables within 15 minutes. If you do not succeed in nding the correct number
of zeros in four tables you earn 10 talers instead.
Work phase screen
 
During the work phase, you will receive eight sheets with zeros and ones. Please
begin on sheet 1 and count the number of zeros on this sheet. Enter the number
of zeros in the input box in the middle of the computer screen. After entering
the number click on the OK-button. If you entered the correct number, you may
continue with sheet 2. If you entered a number that is higher by 1 or lower by 1
than the correct number, your number will also be rated as correct. If you enter
a number that deviates by more than plus/minus 1 from the correct number, your
input will be rated as false. You then have another two tries to enter the correct
number for this sheet. Thus, you have three tries in total for each sheet. In the
36top-right hand corner of the screen, you can see the remaining time in seconds. The
time starts at 900 seconds = 15 minutes and counts backwards.
Please note: the red number above the OK-button indicates the number of the
current sheet. If you enter three times a wrong number for a sheet, the counter for
the current sheet changes to the next sheet. If this occurs, please put the current
sheet aside and start the next one.
You have a total of eight sheets at your disposal. As soon as you found the
correct number of zeros on four sheets, the task is completed successfully and you
receive 100 talers. You then have nished the work phase. If you do not
succeed in completing the task within 15 minutes, you earn 10 talers instead.
Please note: Experience shows that is helpful to mark the 50th, 100th...
counted zero. If you miscount in this case you do not have to start all over again
but you can continue from the last marked zero.
Shopping phase
The shopping phase starts as soon as it has been determined for every participant
if he or she completed the task of the work phase successfully. You will make two
shopping decisions. Your credit balance is split equally between the two decisions.
If you completed the task of the work phase successfully you have 100/2 = 50 talers
at your disposal per purchasing decision, otherwise you have 10/2 = 5 talers.
During the shopping phase you can spend your money on two things that will be
called housing and clothing. You decide which amount of housing and clothing
you want to buy. Expenses for housing denote the rent of the apartment.
The value housing and clothing have for you are expressed in points that are
exchanged into euro at the end of the experiment and paid out to you. How valuable
a specic amount of housing or clothing is for you is denoted in two tables during
the experiment. Below you see an example. In this example numbers of points
and prices take on dierent values than in the experiment. The sole purpose of
this example is to help you become familiar with the procedure of the purchasing
decision.
37Example of shopping phase
Housing Clothing
Units Points Units Points Your credit balance
0 0 0 0 20 talers
1 6 1 16
2 11 2 24 Prices per unit
3 15 3 27 Housing: 4 talers
4 18 4 29 Clothing: 3 talers
5 20 5 30
In the left column of each table, the dierent amounts that are oered for sale
are presented. The right column indicates how many points you get for the purchase
of the corresponding amount. You can read from the table \Housing" that in this
example 0 units of housing have a value of 0 points for you, 1 unit of housing has a
value of 6 points, 2 units 11 points, and so on.
Your credit balance for the purchase is indicated in the top-right panel; in this
example 20 talers. In the bottom-right panel you nd the prices (in talers) for
housing and clothing; prices are per unit. The prices for housing and clothing are
dierent. The table \Prices per unit" shows that in this example a unit of housing
costs 4 talers while clothing costs 3 talers per unit.
In the purchasing decision, you decide how many units of housing and
how many units of clothing you want to buy. You can choose freely how many
units to buy as long as the total price does not exceed your credit balance.
The total price of your purchase is calculated as follows:
Total price of purchase = (units of housing  price per unit of housing)
+ (units of clothing  price per unit of clothing)
As soon as you have decided how many units of housing and how many units of
clothing to buy, it is determined how many points you will get for this decision. If
you do not spend your entire credit balance, the talers not spent are forfeited.
Additionally, talers from the rst purchasing decision cannot be kept for the second
purchasing decision.
The total number of points is calculated as follows:
38Total number of points = points for purchased units of housing
+ points for purchased units of clothing
Example of a purchase
In the example mentioned above, you have a credit balance of
20 talers. Imagine you wanted to buy 3 units of housing and
2 units of clothing. Then you have to pay [(3  price per unit of
housing) + (2  price per unit of clothing)] talers, i.e., 12+6 = 18
talers. This purchase is possible with your credit balance.
In the tables, you nd the number of points you get for this
purchase. You get 15 points for 3 units of housing and 24
points for 2 units of clothing. Your purchase would thus earn
you 15 + 24 = 39 points
Please note: It is only possible to buy one amount of each good. For example,
if you want to buy altogether 4 units of clothing, the point value that is noted next to
the number 4 (29 points) matters for you. You cannot buy rst one unit of clothing
and then another 3 units of clothing, for example.
On the computer, you make your decisions on the input screen of the shopping
phase. Below you see a screen shot of this input screen. The screen contains all
information that you need for your decision: tables for the point values of housing
and clothing, your credit balance and the prices per unit. The actual point values
and prices used in the experiment have been replaced with \XXX".
39Shopping phase screen
 
In the bottom-right hand corner of the screen, you can see two input elds. After
having decided how many units of housing and of clothing to buy you enter your
decision in these two elds and conrm your choice by clicking on the OK-button.
After having clicked on the OK-button you cannot change your decision
anymore. Your decision will be shown again on the screen. Please write your
decision on the decision sheet that was handed out with these instructions. If you
click on the OK-button although you would spend more talers than you have at
your disposal, an error message is displayed and you have the possibility to correct
your decision.
If you have any questions please hold your hand out of the cubicle; we will then
come to you.
When all participants have answered the example questions correctly, the experi-
ment starts with the working phase. When all participants have nished the working
phase, you will be presented again short instructions for the rst purchasing deci-
sion on the computer screen. Also for the second purchasing decision, the screen will
show short instructions. As soon as all participants have taken the second purchas-
ing decision the computer screen shows a questionnaire. After the questionnaire,
40the experiment is over.
Please answer the example questions handed out with these instructions before
the experiment starts.
On-screen Instructions
Before the Working Phase
The working phase is about to start now. If you succeed in counting the correct
number of zeros on four sheets within 15 minutes, you have completed the task
successfully and you get 100 talers. If you do not succeed in completing the task
successfully you get 10 talers instead.
Please click on the OK-button to start the working phase.
Before the First Purchasing Decision
You completed the task successfully. Your credit balance per purchasing
decision is thus 50 talers.
In the following shopping phase you will make two purchasing decisions.
You decide how many units of housing and how many units of clothing to buy.
You can read from the tables on the screen how many points you will get for your
decision. If you do not spend all your credit balance, the talers not spent will be
forfeited.
Before the Second Purchasing Decision
Lab Label treatment
For the second purchasing decision, you get a housing subsidy of 30 talers in
addition to your credit balance of 50 talers. You can spend the housing subsidy
only on housing.
If the amount you spend on housing is lower than the amount of the housing
subsidy, i.e., lower than 30 talers, the part of the subsidy that is not spent is for-
feited.
41The housing subsidy is the only dierence compared to the rst purchasing
decision. All prices and point values remain the same.
Please note: When entering your purchasing decision, please report the total
number of units you buy, no matter whether you paid them out of your own credit
balance or out of the housing subsidy.
Lab Cash treatment
For the second purchasing decision, you get a subsidy of 30 talers in addition to
your credit balance of 50 talers. You can spend the subsidy on housing, on clothing
or on both.
If you do not spend the whole subsidy, the part of it that is not spent is forfeited.
The subsidy is the only dierence compared to the rst purchasing decision.
All prices and point values remain the same.
Please note: When entering your purchase decision, please report the total
number of units you buy, no matter whether you paid them out of your own credit
balance or out of the subsidy.
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